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a b s t r a c t 
We experimentally study causal effects of competitive experience in markets with a short 
and a long side on efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. We find that 
market experience affects efficiency when traders previously competed in the same mar- 
ket on the same side. The effect is strong for market-loser pairs and also exists for market- 
winner pairs, albeit to a lesser extent. Cooperation efficiency is unaffected for pairs con- 
sisting of a market-winner and a market-loser. When traders did not interact on the same 
market before, efficiency of cooperation is higher for market-winner pairs, but only in the 
short run. 
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1. Introduction 
Market competition is commonly considered to be a beneficial force and there is no doubt that competitive markets
are important for the efficient allocation of resources. This is demonstrated theoretically in the First and Second Welfare
Theorems (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995 ) and shown empirically in many field studies and in experiments with double
auctions and other competitive market institutions (see, e.g., Smith, 1962; Davis and Holt, 1993 ). However, an important
question is whether the efficiency effects of markets are not circumscribed to the market environment itself but spill over
and affect efficiency in other spheres of social and economic interaction. This is especially relevant in relation to interactions
through personal exchange where cooperation can not be completely regulated through formal contracts. In this paper we
study, using laboratory experiments, whether and how trading experience in a highly competitive market causally affects
the efficiency of cooperation in a social dilemma situation outside the market environment. 1 
Competitive market experience can have various facets. A salient feature of modern market societies is that the pro-
ductive assets – including human capital – are distributed rather unequally (see, e.g., Cowell and Van Kerm, 2015 ). As a
consequence, some people’s skills or assets are in high demand in the market, with many others trying to transact with
them, while those of others are in much lower demand. Some people may even have difficulties to trade at all (see, e.g.,
Marquis et al., 2014 , for labor markets). Our focus is on whether different market experiences of ‘market-winners’ and
‘market-losers’ differentially affect the efficiency of cooperation in social dilemma situations, beyond potential income ef-
fects (see, e.g., Bowles, 1998 ; Smith, 1998 , and our more detailed discussion below). ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: jordi.brandts@iae.csic.es (J. Brandts), a.riedl@maastrichtuniversity.nl (A. Riedl). 
1 Throughout the paper we use the term efficiency of cooperation to refer to the total surplus produced in a social dilemma situation. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103318 
0014-2921/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
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Another important aspect that may matter for the efficiency of cooperation in a social dilemma situation outside the
market is whether agents are dealing with somebody they have to compete with in the same market or whether competition
is experienced with somebody else. It may make a difference whether one has, for example, to supply a local public good
jointly with a neighbor who is competing for the same job or customers, or with somebody who is not a direct competitor
on the market (see, e.g., Henrich et al., 2001 , and our more detailed discussion below). In our study, market interaction takes
place in a highly competitive continuous double auction (see Smith, 1962 ). We use this market institution because it has
been shown to consistently converge to the efficient Walrasian outcome and does so through a decentralized equilibrating
process in which bids and offers are made and prices and transactions emerge over time (see, e.g., Davis and Holt, 1993 ). It
is the effect on cooperation of having experienced such highly competitive and efficient markets we are interested in. 2 
We designed the experiment in a way that allows us to study the two specific dimensions of spillover effects introduced
above. First, we can investigate if and how effects differ depending on whether people are on the favorable or unfavorable
side of a market. We achieve this by using the so-called box-design of a market that involves a long and a short side of the
market with inelastic supply and demand curves ( Holt et al., 1986 ). This market configuration implies that individuals on
one side of the market will easily make transactions at favorable prices, whereas individuals on the other side of the market
will have difficulties to make transactions and will do so at unfavorable prices, if they transact at all. 
This feature represents in a stark way the very unequal opportunities that exist in some market economies or market
segments (e.g., labor markets for high and low skilled workers). 3 It will also give rise to endogenous earnings differentials
among agents. Thus, there will be market-winners with high earnings from market interactions and market-losers with
low earnings. Our main interest is in how different market experiences affect behavior in a social dilemma game keeping
everything else equal. We therefore control for earnings differences as explained further below. 
The second dimension of market experience we investigate relates to whether people have to overcome the social
dilemma problem together with people with whom they have had or have not had a joint market experience. In the exper-
iment we can study this by immersing participants into the same competitive market environment but matching them for
the social dilemma exogenously in a way that ensures that they do or do not share a common market experience. 
The social dilemma we investigate is a repeated two-person public goods game in which pairs are fixed throughout
all periods ( Chaudhuri, 2011; Kagel and Roth, 2012 ). Our design allows us to explore how, respectively, pairs of market-
losers, market-winners and mixed pairs (i.e, pairs consisting of a market-loser and a market-winner) are affected in their
efficiency of cooperation. In addition, we vary whether pairings in the social dilemma game come from the same market or
from different markets. For convenience we will refer to the former case as Market-Partners and the latter case as Market-
Strangers. Finally, within the context of our experiment, we are not only interested in the immediate impact of market
interaction on cooperation but also ask whether an eventual effect fades out, persists, or is reinforced over time, a distinction
we will refer to with the labels ‘short run’ and ‘long run’, for ease of exposition. 
Our study also relates to the broader issue of the influence of institutions on economic and social motivations, which still
is an under-explored topic in economics ( Fehr and Hoff, 2011 ). For instance, van Winden (2012) argues that to understand
economic and social interactions one needs to take into account the existence and dynamics of social ties between people
and how they are affected by the context in which these interactions take place. Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) present an
extensive survey of the evidence documenting that social motivations are not necessarily separable from the environment
and experiences related to the environment. 
There are two prominent contrasting views pertaining to the potential spillover effects of markets on non-market activi-
ties requiring cooperation. Smith (1998) builds on Adam Smith to postulate that people intuitively know how to behave both
in a cooperative and in a competitive way depending on the context. According to this view, both behaviors grow out of a
universal propensity for social exchange which “finds expression in both personal exchange in small-group social transac-
tions and in impersonal trade through large-group markets.” ( Smith, 1998 , p.3) Smith sees cooperative and non-cooperative
behavior as peacefully coexisting, with efficiency in impersonal markets being based on competitive behavior, while effi-
ciency in personal social exchange requires the ability to find ways to engage with others to avoid free-riding. This view
implies that market experience should not affect behavior outside the market. 
Relatedly, Henrich et al. (2001) report correlational evidence suggesting that market interaction can have positive effects
on cooperation. They find that “the higher the degree of market integration (...) the greater the level of cooperation in
experimental games.” ( Henrich et al., 2001 , p. 74) The rationale for this relation proposed by these authors is that “the more
frequently people experience market transactions, the more they will also experience abstract sharing principles concerning
behaviors towards strangers (...).” ( Henrich et al., 2001 , p. 76) This is consistent with the notion of doux commerce as put
forward among others by Montesquieu (1748) already in the eighteenth century. 
In contrast, Bowles (1998) suggests that market participation can adversely affect people’s personality. Specifically, he
argues that “(...) there are significant differences in the personality effects on participants in markets (...) for people on the2 Needless to say that this does not imply that we consider other market institutions or other competitive environments to be uninteresting. However, 
being the first study exploring competitive market experience on non-market cooperation we chose an institution that (a) is undisputed in being a good 
reflection of decentralized market behavior and (b) does avoid potential confounds due to structural market imperfections and inefficiency (e.g., oligopolistic 
markets). 
3 Less stark representations of unequal market opportunities are conceivable. We consider our implementation as a starting point providing benchmark 
results for other ‘less extreme’ market inequalities. 
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short side (...) and those on the long side of the market, some of which are simply excluded from the exchange process,
while others fear losing the transactions they have secured.” Bowles (1998 , p. 78) concerns can be seen as part of the
broader question asking whether market exchange erodes moral and civic goods worth preserving ( Fourcade and Healy,
2007; Sandel, 2012; 2013 ). This view implies an adverse affect of market experience on the efficiency of cooperation outside
the market, especially for market-losers. 
A priori the diverging views on potential spillover effects of market participation are both reasonable and empirical
evidence is necessary to ascertain their relative merit. If the negative spillover effects of market participation discussed by
Bowles indeed depress the efficiency of voluntary cooperation this would be a major challenge for societies in which markets
play a central role. 4 However, as mentioned above, there are also reasons to believe that market participation is innocuous
or is even beneficial for the efficiency of non-market interactions. With our study we want to contribute to shedding light
on this important issue. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study doing this. 
In the field non-market interactions are affected by a multitude of factors which makes it difficult to tease out the ef-
fect of market experience on the basis of field data. The use of laboratory experiments makes it possible to study spillover
effects of market participation with a high degree of control under ceteris paribus conditions. Specifically, we are able to ex-
ogenously assign participants to the two sides of the market. Without laboratory control naturally more cooperative people
might be over-represented on one or the other side. Similarly, we are able to control the composition of the groups in the
subsequent social dilemma and, hence, study behavior for all possible matchings between participants with different market
experiences. 5 
Our experimental set-up includes both market treatments and non-market treatments. We directly compare behavior
in market treatments with that in non-market treatments. In the latter participants have no market experience and are
endowed with earnings that are on average equal to the market earnings made by participants with market experience.
This allows us to separate the effects of being a market-loser or market-winner from that of just having higher or lower
earnings. As different market positions inevitably are associated with different earnings potentials, this separation would be
virtually impossible with field data. In additional control treatments we test if it matters (a) whether or not participants are
informed about (potentially) different earnings and (b) whether it makes a difference when agents have to work for their
earnings instead of receiving them as windfall gains. 
Our results show that market experience can affect the efficiency of cooperation outside the market and that the precise
strength and direction of the spillover effect depends on specific market circumstances. For traders with a joint competitive
market experience (Market-Partners) we find that the efficiency of cooperation decreases strongly for market-loser pairs and
also, albeit to a lesser extent, for market-winner pairs. In contrast, in Market-Strangers, pairs of market-winners manage to
cooperate more efficiently than comparable pairs without market experience but this holds only in the short run. Thus,
having competed for scarce resources on the same side of the same market depresses efficiency in the social dilemma. 
In two subsequently conducted treatments, we subject our Market-Partners results to additional scrutiny. First, we test if
making fully transparent the earnings received before the social dilemma game affects the outcomes. Second, in a treatment
that we pre-registered, we replaced the market that takes place before the social dilemma game by an individual real-effort
task which yielded an experience parallel to that of the market. The results from these new treatments are similar to those
of the original ones, albeit the significance levels tend to be weaker. This points to the possibility that, when adding features
that define market interactions compared to non-market situations, cooperation behavior after having experienced these
altered non-market situations may approach cooperation behavior after market experience. 
In summary, our results comparing the treatment with market experience to the different control treatments indicate
that the observed differences in the efficiency of cooperation cannot be solely explained by earnings differentials or by other
differences that do not pertain to market interaction per se. Hence, we can attribute a substantial part of the cooperation
differences in a causal sense to different market experiences in the cases we study. We note that with our experiment we
cannot uniquely identify the mechanism behind our results. However, we can offer a tentative explanation of our main
results in terms of direct competition weakening social ties, and of the more general notion of state-dependent preferences,
in conjunction with a positive effect of advantageous market experience on the efficiency of cooperation. 6 
2. Related experimental literature 
There are a number of related experimental papers studying the effect of competition on behavior in a variety of environ-
ments. None of them deals with how interaction in competitive markets under different circumstances affects subsequent
efficiency in cooperation. The efficiency of markets—in the sense of the generation of economic surplus—is a central issue
in economics. However, in case of spillover effects from markets to non-market interactions this may not reflect the overall4 Our focus is on spillover effects on efficiency, because they are more directly economically relevant. However, spillover effects could also be on psy- 
chological dimensions like efficacy as captured in the Rotter score (see Rotter, 1966 ) or social dominance orientation (see Sidanius and Pratto, 2004 ). 
5 Another advantage of lab experiments is the possibility of replication which allows for a systematic study of the relevant issues. See Falk and Heck- 
man (2009) for a methodological discussion of the relevance of laboratory experiments in the economic and social sciences. 
6 For behavioral and neuronal evidence on the existence and dynamics of social ties even in the anonymous environment of laboratory experiments, see, 
e.g., Sonnemans et al. (2006) and Bault et al. (2015) . 
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efficiency effect of markets. Here we investigate how market experience under different circumstances affects after-market
efficiency. We now briefly refer to some previous work and highlight the differences with our work. 
Bauernschuster et al. (2013) use partner-choice games to study how competition between two investors interacts with
trust and trustworthiness. In simple one-shot trust games they find that competition among trustors does not signifi-
cantly increase sent amounts. However, trustees react to competition between trustors by lowering return ratios. Similarly,
Huck et al. (2012) study a repeated binary trust game related to a market for an experience good with a fixed price where
the buyer can choose whether to trust or not and the seller can only choose quality. Without competition, buyers are in
each period randomly assigned to sellers. With competition, buyers choose in each period the seller from whom they want
to buy. The authors report that the introduction of competition is highly effective, with efficiency rising from 30 to over
80%. 
Brandts et al. (2009) also use partner-choice games to study the effects of rivalry on the disposition towards others and
on subjective well-being. They use a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game between fixed triads of players, where one
of the three players can in each period choose with whom of the other two players to interact, leaving the third player
without interaction. The results show that rivalry affects individuals differently, depending on which side of the rivalry they
are on. It negatively affects experienced well-being of those on the powerless side of the interaction and has a positive
effect for the powerful player leading to a larger inequality in experienced well-being. Interacting under rivalry also affects
negatively the disposition towards others. Interestingly, the efficiency of cooperation is the same in conditions with and
without rivalry. 
Herz and Taubinsky (2018) use another partner-choice game to study how experience with competition shapes fairness
standards. In their experiment participants first take part in ultimatum games with either proposer or responder competition
and then play the standard ultimatum game. They find that responders’ acceptance thresholds are higher for responders that
started in the game with proposer competition than for those who started in the game with responder competition. 
Partner-choice games as the ones used in the studies just mentioned involve an element of competition. However, in our
view this kind of games do not adequately represent full-fledged market competition as the one we study, with both sides
of the market participating actively and multiple transactions taking place. 
Carpenter and Seki (2006) report on a field experiment conducted with three groups of workers from a fishing com-
munity in Japan, where the different groups were exposed to different amounts of competition on-the-job. The results
show that these differences explain differences in cooperation in an experimental setting. Specifically, fishermen and fish
wholesalers, who interact in more competitive environments are significantly less cooperative than staff who faces little
competition on the job. This study is perhaps closest to our work, but does not speak directly to the issue of how the
effects of market interaction can be distinguished from that of income differences. Moreover, the investigated on-the-job
competition varies several variables simultaneously (e.g., intensity of competition and occupation), while we investigate the
effect of competition on the efficiency of cooperation for agents who have been on either the long side or the short side of
the market as well as for agents who have been on different market sides, keeping everything else equal. The mentioned
study does also not speak to the effect of competition with strangers, which we investigate in one of our treatments. Lastly,
as this study uses natural groups it cannot exclude selection effects. 
Falk and Szech (2013) study behavior in a context in which market exchange can produce a negative externality – in
their case the death of mice. They find that repeated market interaction typically yields less socially responsible behavior
than one-shot non-market behavior. Bartling et al. (2015) present a comparison of social concern between Switzerland and
China. They study behavior in both a non-market and a market context. They find that in both countries subjects exhibit less
social concern in a market than in a non-market environment. In addition, they find that while there is no cross-country
difference in behavior in a non-market context, in a market context social concern is lower in China than in Switzerland. 7 
Whether market participation makes one more disposed to subsequently hurt others is in our view different from the effects
of subsequent cooperation efficiency and, in addition, in these studies the relevance of the specific conditions under which
one participates in the market are not studied. 
Two studies compare the effects of interacting under respectively, tournament and piece-rate incentives of subjects on
Amazon Mechanical Turk on subsequent behavior. Buser and Dreber (2016) find that individuals are significantly less coop-
erative in a public goods game after having interacted under tournament incentives than under piece-rate. Chen (2011) com-
pares the effects of interacting under competitive and piece-rate conditions on charitable donations and finds that a com-
petitive environment leads to higher donations. 
The focus and set-up of our study is quite different from the cited studies and complements important insights generated
by this previous work. Our study reports the first causal evidence of different forms of competitive market experiences on
the efficiency of cooperation controlling for the effects of differential earnings, which allows us to identify the effects of
market interaction net of income effects. Specifically, we investigate the efficiency effects of experienced competition in
markets with very unequal participation opportunities in which the experience of being on one or the other side of the7 In a non-market context, Peysakhovich and Rand (2015) use a repeated prisoner’s dilemma to study how being in environments that are conducive 
to cooperation lead to higher prosociality and trust in a subsequent one-shot situation than being in environments that do not support cooperation. The 
authors interpret this result in terms of the creation of habits of virtue. 
J. Brandts and A. Riedl / European Economic Review 121 (2020) 103318 5 
Table 1 
Sequence of events in market treatments. 
1. Self-assessment of subjective well-being (SWB 1) 
2. Measurement of social value orientation (SVO 1) 
3. Double auction market (18 periods) (DAM) 
4. Social dilemma game (6 periods) (SDG) 
5. Self-assessment of subjective well-being (SWB 2) 
6. Measurement of social value orientation (SVO 2) 
7. Surprise restart social dilemma game (12 periods) (sSDG) 
8. Post-experiment questionnaire 
Note: SWB 1, SVO 1, SWB 2, and SVO 2 are described in detail in Online 
Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
market is vivid. 8 In comparison to other studies we investigate factors typical for markets that have not been explored
earlier. In particular, we can analyze the effect of asymmetric positions in the market (market-losers vs. market-winners)
and the effect of more or less common experience of market competition (Market-Partners vs. Market-Strangers). 
3. Experiment design 
Our design has two main building blocks: (1) a highly competitive continuous double auction market (hereafter, DAM)
and (2) a social dilemma game (hereafter, SDG). We implemented four main treatments: two market treatments in which the
DAM is played before the SDG, and two non-market treatments, consisting of three conditions each, that control for earnings
achieved in the market phase of the market treatments. All treatments also involve two measurements of subjective well-
being (SWB) and of social value orientation (SVO). To keep the paper focused we describe the two main building blocks
(DAM and SDG) in detail here but relegate the description of the SWB and SVO to Online Appendix A. In the following we
first present the two market treatments followed by the two non-market treatments. 9 
3.1. Market treatments 
Both market treatments consisted of eight parts. Table 1 shows the sequence of events. At the very beginning, partici-
pants were informed that the experiment would have several parts. Instructions for the various parts were given separately
for each part, except those for parts 3 and 4 which were presented together. 10 
In part 1 (SWB 1) all participants had to answer a self-assessment question to measure their initial subjective well-being
and in part 2 (SVO 1) they had to make money allocation decisions to measure their social value orientation. In part 3
(DAM) they interacted in 18 periods of the DAM and in part 4 (SDG) in six periods of the SDG. In parts 5 and 6 (SWB 2 and
SVO 2, respectively) participants had again to self-assess their subjective well-being and make money allocation decisions
to measure post interaction social value orientation. Part 7 (sSDG) consisted of a ‘surprise’ restart of the SDG, lasting for 12
periods. In part 8, participants answered questions about their individual characteristics. As mentioned above we focus on
the description of the main building blocks of the experiment, that is Parts 3, 4, and 7. 
Parts 3 and 4: DAM and SDG 
To explore the potential effects of market experience on the efficiency of cooperation we wanted the SDG to start im-
mediately after the markets closed. To achieve this, participants received the instructions for DAM and SDG together. This
appears to be a more natural setting than the alternative where participants are ignorant of (potential) further interactions
after having traded in a market. 11 After having read the instructions and before the start of DAM participants had to answer
comprehension questions about both DAM and SDG. 
In each of the two market treatments participants interacted in the DAM for 18 periods and in each period there were
the same three sellers and five buyers. Each seller was endowed with two units of a good which could be sold to the buyers
and each buyer could buy up to two units. Thus, total market supply was six units and total market demand ten units,
implying that buyers were on the long side of the market. We chose to give every trader two units (instead of only one) to
create a thicker market with more trades without having to increase the number of traders. The production costs of each
unit of the three sellers was 10 and the redemption value of each unit of the five buyers was 100. This gives a so-called8 A situation reminiscent of the notion of the reserve army of labor introduced by Engels (1987/1845 ). Some observers, see e.g., Standing (2011) , consider 
that in modern globalized economies there now exists a new reserve army of labor, comprised of temporary and part-time workers, who lack any type of 
job security. 
9 The experiment instructions can be found in Online Appendix D. 
10 Sequentially presenting the different parts of the experiment involves an element of non-full immediate disclosure of information. Importantly, partici- 
pants were informed beforehand that the experiment consisted of several parts and that for some parts they would receive detailed information only when 
the respective part starts. We used this structure because it avoids anticipation effects for the second SDG and in that way allows for a cleaner comparison 
between ‘short run’ and ‘long run’ effects of market interaction on the efficiency of cooperation. 
11 Knowing that there will be a SDG after the market may have the potential to affect market behavior. However, the literature on double auction market 
experiments overwhelmingly shows that market forces wipe out other concerns ( Davis and Holt, 1993 ). Our market results reported below corroborate 
these findings and do not suggest that the information given on the SDG has affected market behavior in a substantial way. 
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box design with perfectly inelastic supply and demand ( Holt et al., 1986 ). We chose that design because it creates distinct
market experiences for agents on respectively the short and the long side of the market. Moreover, as traders on each side
have identical market positions their behavior can be cleanly compared. 
The earnings from the sale of a unit were equal to the price at which the unit was traded minus production costs of 10,
while the earnings from the purchase of a unit were equal to 100 minus the price at which the unit was traded. Not traded
units created neither gains nor losses. The price was allowed to have any integer value between 10 and 95 (inclusive). We
chose this upper bound on the trading price to break indifference and facilitate trade ( Davis and Holt, 1993; Noussair and
Tucker, 2013 ). 
More formally, in each period the earnings of a buyer in the market were given by 
u = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎩ 
(100 − p x ) + (100 − p y ) if the buyer buys one unit at price p x 
and another unit at price p y 
(100 − p z ) if the buyer buys one unit at price p z 
0 if the buyer does not buy any unit, 
and the profit of a seller is given by 
π = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎩ 
(p x − 10) + (p y − 10) if the seller sells one unit at price p x 
and another unit at price p y 
(p z − 10) if the seller sells one unit at price p z 
0 if the seller does not sell any unit, 
where p x , p y , p z ∈ { 10 , 11 , . . . , 94 , 95 } . 
The markets were anonymous and, depending on the market role, a trader knew her own production cost or redemption
value, but did not know those of the other traders. Hence, traders did not receive information about the earnings of the
other market participants. Participants were informed about the total number of buyers and sellers active in the market.
We chose this information regime because it has been shown to minimize potentially confounding factors, like fairness
considerations, and, thus, allows us to focus on the effects of market interaction per se . It also facilitates convergence to the
competitive equilibrium ( Smith, 1976; Holt et al., 1986 ) guaranteeing asymmetric market experience of buyers and sellers as
intended. In the competitive equilibrium all six units are traded at price 95. Sellers’ per unit equilibrium profit is 85 (95–10)
and buyers’ per unit equilibrium earnings are 5 (100–95). 
In the DAM traders had to follow particular trading rules equivalent to those used in previous double-auction market
experiments: 
1. Buyers make purchase offers and sellers make sale offers. A purchase offer consists of a price at which to buy a unit. A
sale offer consists of a price at which to sell a unit. 
2. Only the highest purchase offer and the lowest sale offer are the so-called pending prices at which transactions can take
place. 
3. A transaction takes place automatically if the price of a purchase (sale) offer that is made is equal or higher (lower)
than the price of the pending sale (purchase) offer. The transaction price is always the pending price, regardless of the
offer that leads to the transaction. A transaction also takes place if a pending purchase (sale) offer is accepted by a seller
(buyer). 
4. New price offers have to be improvements. That is, a new purchase (sale) offer has to be higher (lower) than the pending
purchase (sale) offer. 
5. If a transaction takes place the market clears and any purchase offer or sale offer in the feasible price interval is possible
again. 
6. The units of the good are traded one by one. That is, traders cannot make offers for or trade several units at a time. 
The DAM was conducted for 18 consecutive periods with the same fixed group of eight participants. Participants in a
market did not know who they were matched with. A trading period ended after three minutes or when no trades were
possible any more. All participants were informed about their role in the market, buyer or seller, at the beginning of the
18 periods of the DAM and were also told that these roles would stay constant throughout these periods. During the DAM
buyers and sellers could see the purchase and sale offers and transaction prices but not the identities behind the offers and
transactions. Hence, traders could not track others’ individual behaviors across market periods. When a trade took place,
traders received information only about their own earnings. At the end of a trading period each trader received information
about his or her total earnings in that period. 
Immediately, after the 18 periods of the DAM, participants played six periods of the SDG. The SDG was a two-person
linear public goods game and pairs stayed the same throughout the game. In each period each participant was endowed
with 50 ECU and had to distribute them between a private and a public account. We used an MPCR = 0 . 9 so that for every
unit that a player put into the public account both players in the pair obtained 0.9 units. 12 Formally, in each period of the12 The two-person version of the public goods game allowed us to obtain a relatively large number of independent observations at relatively low costs. 
The chosen MPCR was informed by pilot sessions with stand-alone two-person public goods experiments with the same subject pool as in the reported 
experiments. There we observed that an MPCR = 0 . 9 lead to efficiency levels of about 50%, leaving about the same room for efficiency improvement and 
worsening, respectively, in the market treatments. 
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Fig. 1. Matchings in the SDG in Market-Partners and Market-Strangers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SDG, earnings of a participant i were given by 
w i = 50 − g i + 0 . 9(g 1 + g 2 ) , 
with g i (i = 1 , 2) being player i ’s amount allocated to the public account. In the SDG, contribution decisions were made
simultaneously. After each participant had made his/her decision each pair received information about decisions in their
pair; that is, own contribution, other’s contribution, own earnings, and other’s earnings. 
As already mentioned above, the matching in the SDG differed between the two market treatments, called Market-
Partners and Market-Strangers . In the Market-Partners treatment each participant was matched with one of the other seven
participants from the same DAM. Matching was done such that it led to two pairs of buyers, one pair of sellers and one
pair consisting of a buyer and a seller. Specifically, the instructions specified: “You will be matched with another buyer
(seller) with whom you have interacted in the market.” Hence, in the SDG, participants knew the market role of the other
participant they have been paired with. They were also told that they would stay matched with the same person during the
six periods of the SDG. In this way we created two pairs of prospective market-losers (buyer pairs), one pair of prospective
market-winners (seller pairs) and one pair consisting of a prospective market-loser and market-winner (mixed pairs). 
In the Market-Strangers treatment each participant in a DAM was matched with one other participant from another DAM.
Here the instructions specified: “You will be matched with another buyer (seller) from another market with whom you
have not interacted in the market.” In this case the matchings for the SDG were made using participants from two different
DAMs. The sixteen subjects were matched in a way that led to four buyer-pairs, two seller-pairs, and two mixed pairs. Like
in Market-Partners, market roles were known and the described matchings stayed the same for all periods of the SDG and
participants were informed about this. Fig. 1 provides a graphical representation of the matchings in Market-Partners and
Market-Strangers, respectively. 
Part 7: sSDG 
After the six periods of SDG 1 (and after SVO 2) a surprise restart of the SDG was announced and participants played
an additional 12 periods of the SDG. Each participant was informed that they would be matched with the same person as
in the first six periods. We introduced the surprise restart to check for persistence of any market experience effect and, for
convenience, refer to this distinction as short run vs. long run. It allows us to see if effects on the efficiency of cooperation
would be robust to a re-setting and longer lasting, an issue that is certainly relevant in market environments in the field. 
3.2. Non-market treatments 
As a benchmark to which to compare contribution behavior in the social dilemma game after the market interaction, we
ran treatments where participants played a SDG without having experienced market interaction before. In these treatments,
except for the absence of a DAM, the sequence of events was exactly the same as depicted in Table 1 . Like in the market
treatments, each participant was matched with the same other person both in the first six and the second 12 periods of the
SDG. We call these treatments OSDG (standing for ‘Only’ SDG). We have a treatment that is completely parallel to Market-
Partners, which we will refer to as OSDG-MP, and one parallel to Market-Strangers, denoted by OSDG-MS. 
A crucial feature of the OSDG treatments is that participants received initial lump-sum payments of money, which cor-
responded to the average earnings of participants in different conditions of the market treatments. As we will see in the
results part, there are large earnings differences between sellers and buyers in the DAM. The initial lump-sum payments
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Table 2 
Summary of market treatments and main non-market treatments. 
Market-Partners Market-Strangers 
N = 112 N = 192 
n = 14 n = 12 
Buyer pairs Seller pairs Mixed pairs Buyer pairs Seller pairs Mixed pairs 
N bp = 28 N sp = 14 N mp = 14 N bp = 48 N sp = 24 N mp = 24 
n bp = 14 n sp = 14 n mp = 14 n bp = 12 n sp = 12 n mp = 12 
OSDG-MP OSDG-MS 
N = 72 N = 72 
n = 36 n = 36 
‘Buyer pairs’ ‘Seller pairs’ ‘Mixed pairs’ ‘Buyer pairs’ ‘Seller pairs’ ‘Mixed pairs’ 
N bp = 12 N sp = 12 N mp = 12 N bp = 12 N sp = 12 N mp = 12 
n bp = 12 n sp = 12 n mp = 12 n bp = 12 n sp = 12 n mp = 12 
Note: N ( n )... number of subjects (independent observations) on treatment level; N xp .( n xp )... num- 
ber of pairs (independent observations on pair level); ‘buyer/seller/mixed pairs’ indicates lump-sum 
payment condition mirroring buyer/seller/mixed pairs in the Market-Partners treatment and Market- 
Strangers treatment, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
participants received were meant to control for potential effects of these differences on contribution behavior in the SDG. 13 
The use of a lab experiment makes it possible to control for income differences in this way and, hence, to isolate the effects
of market participation net of earnings differences. 
In each OSDG treatment, each participant was in one of two payment conditions. The conditions differed with respect
to the received lump-sum payment, which corresponded respectively to the average buyer and seller earnings in Market-
Partners and Market-Strangers. The instructions for the SDG in these benchmark treatments were kept as close as possible to
those in the DAM. Regarding the lump-sum payments and the matching with another participant in the OSDG the instruc-
tions said: “You have been assigned initial earnings of X ECU. The other group member is also assigned some initial earnings.
The assignments to you and the other group member are not necessarily the same. You and the other group member will
receive this amount independently of what occurs during the experiment.”14 We deliberately used a vague phrasing regard-
ing the earnings of the other group member because in the DAM participants also only knew their own market earnings
for sure. Market earnings of other traders could not be known because participants did not receive any information about
traders’ redemption values and production costs. 15 We describe the exact lump-sum earnings and corresponding matchings
in the OSDG treatments after we have discussed behavior in markets and thus know earnings from market interaction for
all types of traders (see end of Section 6.1 ). 
4. Experiment procedures 
In total 448 subjects participated in the described main treatments of our experiment. 16 We ran three sessions with
the Market-Partners treatment, four with the Market-Strangers treatment and three with the OSDG treatments. We have
data from 112 subjects in Market-Partners in 14 separate markets, 192 subjects in Market-Strangers in 24 separate mar-
kets, thus 12 interlinked markets, and 144 subjects in OSDG in 72 separate pairs. For Market-Partners we have 56 pairs in
the SDG (28 buyer-pairs, 14 seller-pairs, 14 mixed-pairs) organized in 14 independent matching groups (markets) and for
Market-Strangers we have 96 pairs in the SDG (48 buyer pairs, 24 seller pairs, 24 mixed pairs) organized in 12 indepen-
dent matching groups (interlinked markets across which participants are matched in the subsequent SDG). In OSDG the 72
statistically independent observations (i.e., matched pairs of participants in the SDG) are distributed over six different lump-
sum payment conditions with 12 independent pairs per condition. These lump-sum payment conditions mirror the buyer
pairs, seller pairs, and mixed pairs in the Market-Partners and Market-Strangers treatment, respectively (see Section 6.2 for
details). Table 2 provides an overview of the treatments, number of subjects, number of pairs in the SDG and number of
independent observations in each treatment and pair, respectively. 
In the two market treatments, each participant’s role (buyer or seller) was fixed for the duration of the session. General
instructions were read out aloud at the start of each session. Instructions for the different parts were given on-screen and13 We chose to implement average earnings as lump-sum payments instead of the exact distributions of earnings for two reasons. First, because it highly 
simplifies the already complex design and, second, because within the set of buyers and sellers, respectively, earnings differences are relatively small (see 
Section 6.1 for average earnings and standard errors of earnings). 
14 The actual amount X of ECU used in the instructions depended on the condition the participant was assigned to (see Section 6.1 below). 
15 It has been suggested to us that in the market treatments participants could use observed transaction prices and the dynamics of the market to infer 
something about the earnings of the other side of the market. We acknowledge that this is not impossible, but believe that the earnings information 
possibly extracted is too noisy to have a significant effect. Nevertheless, to check whether full transparency regarding the lump-sum income changes 
contributions in the SDG, we conducted an additional treatment that exactly matches the OSDG-MP but reveals the information about lump-sum incomes 
to both participants in a pair. For details and results, see Section 7 . 
16 In addition, respectively, 90 and 174 subjects participated in two additional non-market treatments (see, Section 7 ) giving a total of 712 participants. 
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participants could read them at their own pace. 17 Participants could ask questions by raising a hand. All questions were
answered in private. 
The experiments were conducted at the LINEEX lab at the University of Valencia using the z-tree program of
Fischbacher (2007) . Each session involved one of the treatments and no one could participate in more than one session. 18
Performance-based earnings were counted in ECU and total earnings consisted of the accumulated earnings across all parts.
Each 100 ECU were worth € 1. Participants did not receive a show-up fee. At the end of a session participants were privately
paid out their earnings in cash. Average earnings were € 33.00 for OSDG and € 29.50 for the market treatments. Non-market
sessions took about 90 min and sessions with market treatments took about 120 min. 
5. Research questions 
Our research questions relate directly to the views of Smith (1998) and Bowles (1998) presented in the Introduction and
to the distinction between state-dependent preferences and separable preferences between economic incentives and social
preferences introduced by Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) . The notion of separability is also implied in the view proposed
by Smith (1998) stating that people are able to decouple behavior in small-group exchange from that in anonymous markets.
In the context of our experiment, separability means that the ability to efficiently cooperate in a social dilemma game is
independent of preceding market experience. 
Alternatively, behavior can depend on the circumstances surrounding the decision situation, which can be captured by
the notion of state-dependence. 19 In the words of Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) : “State-dependence arises because ac-
tions are motivated by a heterogeneous repertoire of preferences from spiteful to payoff-maximizing to generous, for exam-
ple, the salience of which depends on the nature of the decision situation” (p. 373). 20 Applied to our research this implies
that preferences and behavior could be state-dependent in the general sense that market experience affects subsequent co-
operation. Moreover, the effect could be positive and increase cooperation, in accordance with the idea of doux commerce of
Montesquieu (1748) or it could be negative, in line with the social criticism of Engels (1987/1845 ), and decrease subsequent
cooperation. 
As advanced in the Introduction, our focus is on (i) whether market interaction as such affects subsequent behavior
and (ii) whether particular variations in the nature of the market interaction will lead to variations in the efficiency of
cooperation. Our design makes it possible to make a number of specific comparisons of interest. 
First, we can separately compare behavior of agents who competed with each other on the same market (Market-
Partners) and behavior of agents who experienced market interaction on different markets (Market-Strangers) to the be-
havior in the corresponding OSDG treatments as well as compare Market-Strangers with Market-Partners as such. One may
expect the different kinds of relations in the market to differentially affect participants’ attitudes towards the subsequent in-
teraction. In Market-Partners the experience of having competed with each other for scarce resources may on the one hand
inject some sense of social closeness and thus increase cooperation, but on the other hand it may also induce a competitive
state that could be detrimental to efficient cooperation. The Market-Strangers setting may create an atmosphere of more
anonymity and disconnectedness and thereby decrease the motivation to cooperate. On the other hand, the observations of
Henrich et al. (2001) and Henrich et al. (2004) discussed in the Introduction suggest that market experience with strangers
may have a positive effect on cooperation. Thus, a priori, it is an open question whether market interaction leads to more
or less efficient cooperation in Market-Partners and Market-Strangers, respectively. We summarize this thoughts in our first
research question. 
Research Question 1. (a) Does market experience in Market-Partners and Market-Strangers affect the efficiency of
cooperation positively or negatively relative to the corresponding non-market treatments OSDG-MP and OSDG-MS?
(b) Does the efficiency of cooperation differ between Market-Partners and Market-Strangers? (c) Are there differences
between the short run and the long run? 
Further, continuing with the separation between Market-Partners and Market-Strangers we can disaggregate and compare
behavior in different matchings of participants who have been on opposite sides or the same side of the market. In the latter17 The main reason for not reading out aloud all instructions was that this would have revealed information about the potential earnings of buyers and 
sellers in DAM, which we wanted to avoid. 
18 The market sessions have been run in February, March and June 2012 and the non-market sessions in June 2015. The reason for the relatively large 
time gap between sessions is that originally we had conducted a control treatment without any pre-SDG earnings. We were convinced by discussants in 
seminars that this was not the best control treatment as it does not control for the earnings differences generated in the market. The control treatments 
OSDG-MP and OSDG-MS take care of this issue. For completeness we note that a Kruskal–Wallis test across the first OSDG and the reported OSDG-MP and 
OSDG-MS does not detect a difference in contributions ( p ≥ 0.6648). 
19 Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) distinguish between state-dependent and endogenous preferences. In their framework, the term endogenous prefer- 
ences is used in relation to processes with effects that persist in the long run, typically as the result of a process of cultural transmission. In the context 
of our study, the effects we focus on can be better captured in terms of state-dependence. 
20 An example of how state-dependence could be incorporated into a formal model of social preferences is the general model of Charness and Ra- 
bin (2002) . This two-person model has a more standard part with own and other’s payoff and also incorporates a particular parameter that is said to be 
set to 1 when the decision-maker thinks that the counter-part is misbehaving while it is set to 0 when the counter-part is not misbehaving. The state is 
whether the counter-part is misbehaving or not and this gives rise to a repertoire of two different social preferences. 
10 J. Brandts and A. Riedl / European Economic Review 121 (2020) 103318 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
av
er
ag
e 
pr
ic
e 
in
 tr
ea
tm
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
trading period in market
Market−partners Market−strangers
Equilibrium price
Fig. 2. Average trading price dynamics in both market treatments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
case we can also compare whether the market side itself matters. These comparisons are directly related to the potentially
differential effects of experiencing market interaction on respectively the long and short side of markets, as mentioned in
the citation from Bowles (1998) reproduced in the Introduction. They are of particular interest, because they touch on the
important societal issue whether market experience has different repercussions for those who have it easy in the market
(market-winners) compared to those who have a hard time (market-losers), although the term ‘personality effects’ may
be too strong in the context of our experiment. These disaggregated comparisons will all be made with respect to the
corresponding lump-sum payment conditions in OSDG-MP and OSDG-MS, respectively, so as to isolate the effect of market
experience net of earnings differences. In addition, we can also make comparisons across market treatments to explore if
the experience of being on respectively the long and short side of the market has differential effects in Market-Partners and
Market-Strangers. This can be summarized in the following question. 
Research Question 2. (a) Is the efficiency of cooperation of pairs of market-winners, market-losers and traders from
opposite sides of the market affected equally, each compared with the corresponding case in the non-market treat-
ments? (b) Does the efficiency of cooperation of these different pairs of traders depend on whether market interaction
took place in Market-Partners or Market-Strangers? (c) Are there differences between the short run and the long run?
6. Results 
In this section, we first briefly report on market behavior to see if our markets indeed converge to asymmetric equi-
librium outcomes as intended. Thereafter, we zoom in to our research questions and discuss if and how different market
experiences affect behavior in the subsequent social dilemma games. 21 
6.1. Market behavior 
Fig. 2 shows the average transaction price over the 18 trading periods in the two market treatments. As expected, prices
in both treatments converge to the highest possible price of 95. Of the total of 4104 possible trades only 7 were not realized
and overall efficiency was with 99.8% virtually optimal. Thus, markets clear, are efficient and lead to very unequal incomes.
Using individual data, the averages (standard errors) of earnings are 2672 (st.dev.: 277, st.err.: 43) for sellers and 340 (st.dev.:
176, st.err.: 21) for buyers in the Market-Partners treatment and 2656 (st.dev.: 324, st.err.: 38) for sellers and 346 (st.dev.:
222, st.err.: 20) for buyers in the Market-Strangers treatment. 22 21 Results regarding the effect of different experiences in the markets and social dilemma games on subjective well-being and social value orientation can 
be found in Online Appendix C. 
22 Note that if there are any pre-existing social preferences they apparently have little effect on the outcome of the market interaction, due to the 
competitiveness of the institution (see Bolton and Ockenfels, 20 0 0 ). 
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Table 3 
Efficiency of cooperation in market and non-market treatments (across trader matchings). 
Treatment N Short run Long run 
Median Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. 
Market-Partners 14 23.740 23.025 7.556 26.120 22.172 7.502 
OSDG-MP 36 33.167 30.801 13.814 41.104 32.766 15.659 
Market-Strangers 12 32.146 31.418 3.154 31.357 30.422 3.612 
OSDG-MS 36 27.500 28.468 12.197 34.708 31.669 14.551 
MP vs. OSDG-MP p = 0 . 024 ∗∗ p = 0 . 005 ∗∗
MS vs. OSDG-MS p = 0 . 205 p = 0 . 660 
MP vs. MS p = 0 . 006 ∗∗ p = 0 . 001 ∗∗∗
Note: all statistics and tests are based on strictly independent observations; p -values come 
from bootstrap two-sample t -tests, two-sided; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ significant at least at the respectively, 1%, 
5%, 10% level with false discovery rate correction for multiple (six) comparisons ( Benjamini and 
Hochberg, 1995 ); MP (MS) stands for Market-Partners (Market-Strangers). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As expected, neither buyer nor seller earnings significantly differ between Market-Partners and Market-Strangers (buyer
earnings: p = 0 . 6434 , seller-earnings: p = 0 . 5371 ; MW-tests, 2-sided). We can conclude that our manipulation worked as in-
tended. Thus, in both implemented market environments we achieved an efficient allocation of resources with very different
market experiences for participants on the long and on the short side of the market. 
Before moving on to the discussion if and how market experience affects the efficiency of cooperation we briefly ex-
plain how the different lump-sum payment conditions in the non-market treatments OSDG-MP and OSDG-MS were created.
The idea was to match lump-sum (i.e., non-market) earnings of pairs of subjects in OSDG-MP and OSDG-MS with aver-
age earnings of buyer pairs, seller pairs and mixed pairs in Market-Partners and Market-Strangers, respectively. We have
just seen that in Market-Partners sellers earned on average 2672 ECU and buyers 340 ECU. In Market-Strangers the corre-
sponding earnings were 2656 ECU and 346 ECU. To control for these income differences, in OSDG-MP and OSDG-MS we
assigned participants to the following lump-sum earnings pairs: 340-340, 2672-2672, and 2672-340, respectively, to mimic
buyer-buyer, seller-seller, and seller-buyer matchings in Market-Partners and 346-346, 2656-2656, 2656-346 to mimic the
equivalent matchings in Market-Strangers. 
6.2. Efficiency of cooperation after market interaction 
In our presentation of results we use the research questions posed in Section 5 as a guide. We start with Research Ques-
tion 1 where we look at potential effects of market experience per se in Market-Partners and Market-Strangers, respectively,
and do not distinguish between different trader and lump-sum payment types. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics (medians,
means, and standard deviations) for the efficiency of cooperation in the social dilemma game in Market-Partners, Market-
Strangers, OSDG-MP, and OSDG-MS, respectively, as well as relevant bootstrap t -tests of differences between treatments. 23
As explained above we also distinguish between the short run and the long run. 
Focusing first on the Market-Partners treatment we see that contributions in Market-Partners are significantly lower
than in the corresponding OSDG-MP. This holds for the short run ( p = 0 . 024 ) as well as the long run ( p = 0 . 005 ). 24 Note
that the average difference in the short run amounts to about 15.6% of the endowment (7.8 out of 50) and increases to
about 21.2% of the endowment (10.6 out of 50) in the long run. The negative effect of market experience is thus also
economically substantial. In contrast, there is no such negative effect in the Market-Strangers treatment, neither in the short
run ( p = 0 . 205 ) nor in the long run ( p = 0 . 660 ). Finally, a comparison of Market-Partners with Market-Strangers shows that23 Unless indicated otherwise, all reported tests are two-sided bootstrap two-sample t -tests based on strictly independent observations (i.e., matched pairs 
in OSDG-MP and OSDG-MS, markets in Market-Partners, and interlinked markets in Market-Strangers). In the tables we report uncorrected p -values as well 
as significance levels corrected for multiple testing. For details, see the table notes. In Online Appendix B.1 we also provide non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
tests. The attained significance levels are largely the same as those provided here. In case of interesting differences we mention them in the text. We 
use bootstrap t -tests because t -tests also use the rich cardinal information contained in the data, whereas Mann–Whitney tests are based solely on the 
ordinality of the data. Applying the bootstrap technique allows us to conduct t -tests without making any assumptions about the distribution of the data. 
For a discussion of this method and the application to experiment data see, e.g., Moffat (2015) . 
24 For ease of exposition, in the main text we refer to uncorrected p -values. In the tables we report significance levels after correction for multiple testing 
within a given research question. Alternatively, we could have corrected for all tests we have run or even for all tests we could have run, as suggested by 
an anonymous reviewer. In our view the question of correction for multiple hypotheses testing is an important one in order to increase the robustness 
of results ( Camerer et al., 2016 ). A downside of correcting for multiple hypotheses testing is that it increases the likelihood of false negatives. Thus, one 
needs to find the subtle balance between being too liberal (false positives) and too conservative (false negatives). Unfortunately, there is no accepted gold 
standard for this balance and we believe that our approach is a reasonable compromise. We are aware of the fact that we may be low on statistical power 
for some of our tests, due to the many individual observations needed for a statistically independent observation in our market treatments. Correcting 
for more comparisons would likely lead to less statistically significant results and some of our results might be false positives. Therefore, as proposed by 
Maniadis et al. (2014) independent replications may be worthwhile to be undertaken. 
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Table 4 
Efficiency of cooperation in market treatments and non-market treatments for the different trader 
matchings. 
Buyer-buyer pairs 
Treatment N Short run Long run 
Median Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. 
Market-Partners 14 22.042 21.729 8.751 15.000 18.682 11.849 
OSDG-MP (low-pay) 12 33.542 34.243 9.633 41.104 33.038 15.326 
Market-Strangers 12 30.229 29.236 5.854 28.729 27.990 6.707 
OSDG-MS (low-pay) 12 33.125 32.597 9.083 35.875 33.674 13.375 
MP vs. OSDG-MP p = 0 . 003 ∗∗ p = 0 . 039 ∗
MS vs. OSDG-MS p = 0 . 311 p = 0 . 269 
MP vs. MS p = 0 . 018 ∗ p = 0 . 053 ∗
Seller-seller pairs 
Treatment N Short run Long run 
Median Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. 
Market-Partners 14 18.250 21.768 12.413 21.042 20.699 14.385 
OSDG-MP (high-pay) 12 26.500 29.097 15.536 38.521 34.222 15.634 
Market-Strangers 12 34.396 35.486 7.428 34.573 35.168 7.323 
OSDG-MS (high-pay) 12 23.833 23.785 11.064 33.917 31.649 14.522 
MP vs. OSDG-MP p = 0 . 249 p = 0 . 048 ∗
MS vs. OSDG-MS p = 0 . 018 ∗∗ p = 0 . 505 
MP vs. MS p = 0 . 020 ∗∗ p = 0 . 012 ∗∗
Buyer-seller pairs 
Treatment N Short run Long run 
Median Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. 
Market-Partners 14 27.125 26.875 15.507 34.167 30.625 16.213 
OSDG-MP (mixed-pay) 12 32.875 29.063 15.926 35.604 31.038 17.182 
Market-Strangers 12 29.271 31.715 7.368 28.563 30.540 9.051 
OSDG-MS (mixed-pay) 12 33.542 29.021 15.019 33.500 29.684 16.590 
MP vs. OSDG-MP p = 0 . 738 p = 0 . 953 
MS vs. OSDG-MS p = 0 . 597 p = 0 . 890 
MP vs. MS p = 0 . 356 p = 0 . 988 
Note: all statistics and tests are based on strictly independent observations; p -values are from 
bootstrap two-sample t -tests with 999 repetitions ( seed = 713 ), two-sided; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ significant at 
least at the, respectively, 1%, 5%, 10% level with false discovery rate correction for multiple 
(six) comparisons ( Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995 ); MP (MS) stands for Market-Partners (Market- 
Strangers); in OSDG-MP and OSDG-MS ‘low-pay’ corresponds to income matchings 340-340 and 
346-346, respectively, ‘high-pay’ to income matchings 2672-2672 and 2656-2656, respectively, 
and ‘mixed-pay’ to income matchings 340-2672 and 346-2656, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the efficiency of cooperation is substantially and significantly lower in the former than in the latter. Again this holds for the
short and long run ( p = 0 . 006 and p = 0 . 001 ). 25 We summarize in our first result. 
Result 1. (i) Market experience strongly harms the efficiency of cooperation when traders have to solve the social dilemma
with other traders they had previously interacted with in the same market. This holds in the short and in the long run
and the negative effect tends to get larger in the long run. (ii) Market experience does not have a detrimental effect on the
efficiency of cooperation when traders have to solve the social dilemma with other traders they did not interact with on
the market before. This holds in both, the short and the long run. 
Hence, across trader pairings, we find that market participation can be harmful for cooperation but find also that it is
not harmful per se and that this pattern holds in the short run as well as the long run. 
We next move to Research Question 2, whether the aggregate differences just discussed are similar for the different
trader matchings or whether they are driven by specific matchings, and how this differs between Market-Partners and
Market-Strangers. Recall that in buyer pairs the interacting participants both have had a difficult time in securing trades
while in seller pairs participants have competed for trades from a relatively comfortable position. Finally, mixed pairs bring
together very different market experiences. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of contributions and corresponding tests for
the three types of trader matchings, buyer–buyer, seller–seller and buyer–seller, in Market-Partners and Market-Strangers, 25 Regression analysis controlling for time trends and initial social value orientation (SVO 1) corroborates the test results reported here. In fact, the 
significance levels are stronger: the comparisons MP vs. OSDG-MP (long run) and MP vs. MS (short and long run) are significant at the 1% level and 
MP vs. OSDG-MP (short run) at the 5% level after false discovery rate correction for six pair-wise comparisons. For details, see Online Appendix B.2. 
J. Brandts and A. Riedl / European Economic Review 121 (2020) 103318 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
respectively. The corresponding income matchings in OSDG-MP and OSDG-MS for convenience are called low-pay (340-340
and 346-346), high-pay (2672-2672 and 2656-2656), and mixed-pay (340-2672 and 346-2656). 
Focusing on buyer-buyer pairs first we see that the pattern of contributions is the same as for the aggregate data shown
in Table 3 above. Specifically, buyer-buyer pairs contribute less in Market-Partners than low-pay pairs in OSDG-MP, in the
short run ( p = 0 . 003 ) as well as in the long run ( p = 0 . 039 ). 26 Again the difference in average contributions between Market-
Partners and OSDG-MP is economically substantial amounting to 25 and 28.6% of the endowment in the short run and in
the long run, respectively. 27 Also similar to the results across trader pairs, no such differences are found when comparing
buyer-buyer pairs in Market-Strangers with low-pay pairs in OSDG-MS ( p ≥ 0.311). Together this implies that buyer-buyer
pairs in Market-Partners achieve significantly lower cooperation efficiency than buyer-buyer pairs in Market-Strangers, again
in the short run ( p = 0 . 018 ) as well as the long run ( p = 0 . 053 ). 28 
For seller-seller pairs in the Market-Partners treatment the contributions pattern is similar to the one observed for buyer–
buyer pairs but appears to be less pronounced. Seller–seller pairs contribute less in Market-Partners than high-pay pairs in
OSDG-MP in the short run as well as the long run, but the difference is statistically significant only in the latter case
( p = 0 . 249 and p = 0 . 048 ). Looking at the Market-Strangers treatment we see that seller pairs contribute more than high-
pay pairs in OSDG-MS. Now the difference is significant in the short run ( p = 0 . 018 ) but not in the long run ( p = 0 . 505 ).
Finally, when comparing the two market treatments with each other we observe that the efficiency in Market-Partners is
significantly and substantially lower than in Market-Strangers in the short ( p = 0 . 020 ) and the long run ( p = 0 . 006 ). Together
this suggests that for seller-seller pairs there is some negative effect of experienced market interaction, but only when this
interaction is in Market-Partners. 
For mixed buyer–seller pairs there are no significant differences detected when comparing Market-Partners with OSDG-
MP, in the short run ( p = 0 . 738 ) as well as the long run ( p = 0 . 953 ), Market-Strangers with OSDG-MS (short run: p = 0 . 597 ;
long run: p = 0 . 890 ), and Market-Partners with Market-Strangers (short run: p = 0 . 356 ; long run: p = 0 . 988 ). Thus, the
efficiency of cooperation of traders who have been on opposite sides of the market is not hampered by market experience,
irrespective of having interacted on the same or different markets. 29 , 30 We summarize in our next result. 
Result 2. (i) The observed overall adverse effects of market experience on the efficiency of cooperation in Market-
Partners can be mainly attributed to market-loser pairs (buyer–buyer pairs) and, to a lesser extent, also market-winner
pairs (seller–seller pairs). (ii) The efficiency of cooperation in Market-Strangers is unaffected for market-loser pairs and
tends to be enhanced for market-winner pairs, in the short run. (iii) For both, market-loser and market-winner pairs, the
efficiency of cooperation is lower in Market-Partners than in Market-Strangers. (iv) The efficiency of cooperation in trader
pairs composed of market-winners and market-losers (buyer-seller pairs) is unaffected by previous market interaction. 
The result that market experience has no effect whatsoever on traders who have been on opposite sides of markets
(buyer-seller pairs) raises the question whether this is due to that both traders’ contributions are unaffected or that one
trader type contributes more while the other trader type contributes less. To test for this we looked at contributions of both
types separately in the short run and the long run. In addition, as short run and long run levels may be affected by the
dynamics of interaction, we also looked at contributions in the very first period of the first social dilemma game. Table 5
reports the results, which show that in buyer-seller pairs there is virtually no difference in contributions between buyers
and sellers neither in the short nor in the long run. Also in period 1 the differences are small and statistically insignificant
( p = 1 . 0 0 0 in Market-Partners and p = 0 . 4546 in Market-Strangers). From that we conclude that market experience does not
affect the efficiency of cooperation in groups consisting of a market-winner and a market-loser. 
In Online Appendix B we also report comparisons of the efficiency of cooperation between different trader pairs within
in each market treatment. The main result of these comparisons is that traders who have competed on the same market
(i.e., in Market-Partners) and on the same side of the market—either on the favorable side (seller–seller pairs) or on the26 Interestingly, Mann–Whitney tests show even stronger significance results with p = 0 . 0040 in the short run and p = 0 . 0139 in the long run and both 
comparisons are significant at the 5% level after correction for multiple comparisons. See Online Appendix B.1 for details. 
27 Cárdenas et al. (2014) report on a somewhat related result in a field experiment. Using an ultimatum game, they find that ex-combatants (losers in 
the armed conflict) expect to and actually receive lower transfers from public officers and citizens than victims and control groups. 
28 Again, Mann–Whitney tests tend to produce stronger significance results. In particular, after correction for multiple comparisons, the difference between 
Market-Partners and Market-Strangers remains significant at the 5% level. See Online Appendix B.1 for details. 
29 All test results reported her are corroborated by Tobit regression analyses where we control for initial social value orientation (SVO 1) and period 
effects with period dummies. Again, significance levels tend to be stronger using regression analyses: after false discovery rate correction for six pair-wise 
comparisons, for buyer-buyer pairings all comparisons that are significant at at least the 10% level in Table 4 are significant at the 5% level, for seller–seller 
pairs all comparisons that are significant at the 5% (10%) level in Table 4 are significant at the 1% (5%) level. For details see Tables B.8–B.17 in Online 
Appendix B.2. 
30 When taking the very conservative statistical approach and correcting for all 18 comparisons reported in Table 4 we find that the following comparisons 
remain significant at the 10% level: MP vs. OSDG-MP for buyer-buyer pairs in the short run, MS vs. OSDG-MS for seller-seller pairs in the short run, MP 
vs. MS for seller–seller pairs in both the short and the long run, and MP vs. MS for buyer–buyer pairs in the short run. Of these comparisons, for buyer- 
buyer pairs MP vs. OSDG-MP (short run) and for seller-seller pairs MP vs. MS (long run) just miss to reach significance at the 5% level. In addition, the 
comparisons of MP vs. OSDG-MP and MS vs. OSDG-MS in the short run just miss to reach significance at the 10% level. Again, when using Mann-Whitney 
rank sum tests stronger significance results are achieved. With these tests for buyer-buyer pairs the comparisons MP vs. OSDG-MP in the short and long 
run are significant at the 5% level and for seller–seller pairs this is the case for the comparisons MS vs. OSDG-MS in the short run and MP vs. MS in both 
the short and long run. 
14 J. Brandts and A. Riedl / European Economic Review 121 (2020) 103318 
Table 5 
Contributions of buyers and sellers within buyer-seller matchings in market treatments. 
Treatment and role Period 1 Short run Long run 
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
Market-Partners 
Seller 32.500 18.989 27.357 17.176 31.155 15.758 
Buyer 33.286 15.529 26.393 14.135 30.095 17.076 
Market-Strangers 
Seller 34.917 14.163 30.757 8.582 29.615 9.282 
Buyer 37.292 15.250 32.674 7.329 31.465 9.580 
Note: ‘Period1’ statistics are based on individual observations ( N = 14 in Market-Partners, 
N = 24 in Market-Strangers); ‘Short run’ and ‘Long run’ statistics are based on strictly 
independent observations ( N = 14 in Market-Partners, N = 12 in Market-Strangers). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unfavorable one (buyer–buyer pairs)—achieve less efficient cooperation outcomes than pairs of traders who also have been
in the same market but on opposite sides of it (buyer–seller pairs). By contrast, for Market-Strangers having been on the
favorable side of the market causes higher subsequent cooperation levels than having been on the unfavorable side. Thus,
having competed on the same side on a market induces cooperation losses, whereas there seems to be a market-winner
cooperation rent, which can however only be “cashed in” when the cooperation problem occurs with others who have not
been in the same market. 
7. Additional control treatments and discussion 
In the previous section we have seen that relative to our control treatments market interaction has a negative effect in
Market-Partners, especially for buyer–buyer pairs, a less strong and only long-run effect for seller-seller pairs, and no effect
for mixed buyer–seller pairs. Moreover, in Market-Strangers no adverse effects of market interaction have been detected. 
In this section we check and discuss the robustness of the results in Market-Partners by presenting the results of two
additional treatments without market interaction and comparing them to Market-Partners for all three trader matchings.
First, recall that in the market treatments, sellers’ production costs and buyers’ redemption values were private information
making it difficult for participants to infer the market earnings of other buyers and sellers, respectively. Accordingly, in
our OSDG treatments participants received only vague information about the lump-sum payments of other participants
(see Section 3.2 for details). However, it is conceivable that in the market treatments participants could have used observed
transaction prices and trading dynamics to infer something about the earnings of the other traders, especially of the opposite
side. To control for this we ran an additional OSDG with income transparency. This treatment was exactly the same as the
OSDG-MP except that the lump-sum payments within each pair of participants interacting in the social dilemma game was
made transparent when the instructions for the SDG were given. This treatment is labeled OSDG-MP-T. 
In this treatment we collected data from 90 participants who did not participate in any of the sessions reported above. 31 
As in OSDG-MP participants were partitioned into three sets of pairs with lump-sum income pairs of 340-340, 2672-2672,
and 340-2672, respectively, giving 15 independent observations on the pair level. 
Second, we conducted another treatment, called OSDG-MP-RE, where RE stands for real effort. This treatment was exactly
the same as the OSDG-MP, except for the novel feature that the social dilemma game was preceded by an individual real-
effort t ask in which participant s had to earn their lump-sum income. The motivation for this treatment was to design an
environment which had the main features of the market treatments, but without market interaction. 32 
The real effort task consisted of 18 periods each lasting for 95 s, which was the average length of the 18 market periods
in the Market-Partners treatment. This ensured that the time participants spent in the lab before the SDG was the same
as in Market-Partners. In each of these periods participants faced the task of adjusting six sliders in the well-known slider
task of Gill and Prowse (2012) . Each correctly adjusted slider yielded a number of points. In the task participants were
randomly assigned one of two exchange rates of correctly adjusted sliders into experimental currency units (ECU) which
were valid for all 18 periods. Participants were informed of their exchange rate before the start of the slider task. One
exchange rate was such that if a participant adjusted correctly all sliders in all periods, the participant would at the end of
the 18 periods have earned an endowment equal to the average earnings of buyers in the Market-Partners treatment. The
other exchange rate was such that if a participant correctly adjusted all sliders in all periods, the participant would at the
end of the 18 periods have earned an endowment equal to the average earnings of sellers in the Market-Partners treatment.31 In total we conducted three sessions at LINEEX in December 2016. A session lasted between 65 and 70 min with average earnings amounting to 
€ 32,80. 
32 We thank an anonymous reviewer who pointed out the importance of controlling for these features. For this treatment, we conducted in total three 
sessions at LINEEX in December 2018. A session lasted about 120 min with average earnings amounting to about € 32,-. 
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We calibrated the difficulty of the slider task so that all participants indeed earned an endowment equal to those used in
the OSDG-MP treatment. 33 
Participants were informed that in the SDG they were paired with another participant who did exactly the same real
effort t ask. In pairs resembling buyer–buyer (seller–seller) matchings, participants who earned 346 ECU (2672) ECU were
informed that they are paired with another participant who had the same exchange rate in the real effort t ask. In pairs
resembling buyer-seller matchings, participants with a low (high) exchange rate in the real effort task were informed that
they were paired with another participant who had a superior (inferior) exchange rate. Participants were not informed
about the actual performance and thus earnings of their paired participant. In this way we keep the information about
others earnings similar to what participants could reasonably deduce from trading behavior in the markets of the Market-
Partners treatment. For convenience, we will refer to the different pairings in this treatment also as respectively low-pay,
high-pay, and mixed-pay pairings. 
Summarizing, in the OSDG-MP-T treatment (as in OSDG-MP) participants received either the buyer endowment or the
seller endowment as a lump-sum payment. The difference between treatments is that in the OSDG-MP-T participants receive
exact information about the earnings of their paired counterpart in the SDG. This treatment thus controls for information on
the lump-sum earnings. In the OSDG-MP-RE treatment, the information on pre-SDG payments is similar to OSDG-MP but in
contrast to the original control treatment participants had to exert effort to receive these earnings. This treatment controls
for several aspects also present in the Market-Partners treatment. First, as in the market, participants have to exert effort
to receive payments, second, the time spent in the experiment prior to the SDG is exactly the same as in Market-Partners,
third, although not interacting, participants know that the other participants are also engaged in the same real effort task
and, fourth, participants with low (high) exchange rates are exposed to repeated low (high) earnings and, presumably related
frustration (elation) as buyers (sellers) in the markets. Thus, this treatment controls for a number of aspects that arguably
are not unique to market interactions, although these aspects are inevitably linked with interaction on our markets. 
We note that the OSDG-MP-RE treatment was pre-registered at the AEA registry with the following explicit directed
hypotheses, which were guided by Result 2 above: 
Hypothesis 1. (a) Contributions in the buyer-buyer pairings are lower than contributions in the low-pay pairings. (b) Con-
tributions in the seller-seller pairings are (weakly) lower than contributions in the high-pay pairings. (c) Contributions in
the buyer-seller pairings are equal to contributions in the mixed-pay pairings. 
To get a first impression on how the efficiency of cooperation for the three pairings differs across treatments, Fig. 3
shows average contributions for all treatments under consideration (Market-Partners, OSDG-MP, OSDG-MP-T, OSDG-MP-RE)
in the short and the long run. There are several interesting observations to be made. First, for low-pay pairs (panel (a)) we
see that for all three OSDG treatments contributions are higher than in Market-Partners, both in the short and the long
run. There is also an interesting order within the OSDG treatments: contributions are highest in OSDG-MP and lowest in
OSDG-MP-RE, with contribution in OSDG-MP-T being in-between. This order appears in the short and long run, although it
is weaker in the latter case. Second, also for high-pay pairs (panel (b)) it holds that contributions are higher in all OSDG
treatments than in Market-Partners, again both in the short and the long run. In contrast to low-pay pairs, however, there
appears to be (almost) no difference across the three non-market treatments. Third, for mixed-pay pairs (panel (c)) there
are few differences across all treatments, including the market treatment. 
In the following we test for statistical differences in the efficiency of cooperation between Market-Partners and each of
the two additional treatments separately. We base our directed hypotheses on the results observed in the previous sec-
tion. That is, we test if the efficiency of cooperation is smaller in Market-Partners than in OSDG-MP-T and OSDG-MP-RE,
respectively, for buyer-buyer vs. low-pay pairs and seller-seller vs. high-pay pairs. Additionally, we test the undirected hy-
pothesis that for buyer-seller vs. mixed-pay pairs, the efficiency of cooperation does not differ between Market-Partners and,
respectively, OSDG-MP-T and OSDG-MP-RE. 
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics of the two new treatments together with the descriptive statistics of Market-Partners,
for convenience. It also reports the appropriate test statistics. 34 The table reports uncorrected p -values as well as significance
levels after correcting for multiple comparisons within pairings using the false-discovery rate procedure. One can see that
for buyer–buyer and seller–seller pairs, contributions in both OSDG-MP-T and OSDG-MP-RE are significantly higher than in
Market-Partners, both in the short run and the long run at varying degrees of significance. By contrast, for buyer–seller
pairs there are no significant differences between the treatments. For the OSDG-MP-RE the results are consistent with our
Hypotheses 1(a)–1(c) above, at significance levels varying between 5% and 10% (uncorrected and corrected). 
Summarizing the information presented in this section, the statistics shown in Table 6 are consistent with the notion
that market experience leads to a decrease in the efficiency of cooperation in the SDG for participants who competed
on the same side of the market but not for participants who competed on the opposite sides of the market. In addition,
the order of average contribution levels shown in Fig. 3 and the (partly) weaker significance levels for OSDG-MP-T and33 The slider task was calibrated such that half of the participants earn 340 ECU and the other half 2672 ECU. Only one participant did not achieve 
this and earned 2647 ECU instead of the intended 2672 ECU. As the difference is minor and occurred in an early period, we do not exclude data of this 
participant. 
34 All reported test results are corroborated by Tobit regression analyses (see Online Appendix B.2). 
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Fig. 3. Efficiency of cooperation in different treatments for different trader pairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OSDG-MP-RE in comparison to OSDG-MP, suggest that incorporating dimensions that can be viewed as being typical for
market experience into a non-market environment leads to lower cooperation. 
8. Summary and conclusions 
We have studied whether the experience of interacting in a competitive market affects the efficiency of cooperation in
a subsequent social dilemma game played in pairs. In the markets trade takes place in real time and there is a short and
a long side of the market. Participants on the short side have, compared to those on the long side, a strong competitive
disadvantage and it is hard for them to secure transactions. Our experimental design allows us to compare the efficiency of
cooperation with and without previous market experience, holding earnings constant. We can therefore isolate the causal
effect of market experience, decoupled from the effect of the earnings inequality produced in markets. In addition, we can
compare the effect of market experience on the efficiency of cooperation for participants who competed on the same market
with participants who had a comparable market experience but competed on different markets. 
The overall picture that emerges from our experiments has many nuances. Market experience can affect cooperation
negatively but it is neither market experience per se nor being on the long or short side of the market per se that is adverse
to efficient cooperation. It is the fact of having competed with each other in the same market and on the same side that
makes subsequent cooperation difficult, with the impact being clearer for market-losers than for market-winners. Moreover,
market experience can have in the short run a positive effect for those in an advantageous market position (market-winners)
but only when the social dilemma needs to be solved with somebody who has been on a different market before. The latter
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Table 6 
Efficiency of cooperation in Market-Partners treatment and OSDG-T and OSDG-RE for the different 
trader matchings. 
Buyer-buyer pairs 
Short run Long run 
Treatment N Median Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. 
Market-Partners 14 22.042 21.729 8.751 15.000 18.682 11.849 
OSDG-MP-T (low-pay) 15 28.333 29.450 16.268 35.833 29.622 20.295 
OSDG-MP-RE (low-pay) 29 26.250 26.230 13.485 27.792 29.424 14.387 
MP vs. OSDG-MP-T 1 p = 0 . 066 ∗ p = 0 . 058 ∗
MP vs. OSDG-MP-RE 1 p = 0 . 093 ∗ p = 0 . 011 ∗∗
Seller-seller pairs 
Short run Long run 
Treatment N Median Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. 
Market-Partners 14 18.250 21.768 12.413 21.042 20.699 14.385 
OSDG-MP-T (high-pay) 15 23.083 29.150 13.767 28.125 29.625 15.679 
OSDG-MP-RE (high-pay) 29 27.917 29.282 14.221 32.958 29.480 18.207 
MP vs. OSDG-MP-T 1 p = 0 . 082 ∗ p = 0 . 070 ∗
MP vs. OSDG-MP-RE 1 p = 0 . 049 ∗ p = 0 . 052 ∗
Buyer-seller pairs 
Short run Long run 
Treatment N Median Mean St. dev. Median Mean St. dev. 
Market-Partners 14 27.125 26.875 15.507 34.167 30.625 16.213 
OSDG-MP-T (mixed-pay) 15 29.833 31.428 17.155 39.125 29.967 19.162 
OSDG-MP-RE (mixed-pay) 29 30.417 30.431 12.592 28.958 29.802 16.251 
MP vs. OSDG-MP-T 2 p = 0 . 481 p = 0 . 925 
MP vs. OSDG-MP-RE 2 p = 0 . 485 p = 0 . 879 
Note: all statistics and tests are based on strictly independent observations; p -values are from boot- 
strap two-sample t -tests with 999 repititions ( seed = 713 ), 1(2) one-(two-)sided; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ significant 
at least at the, respectively, 1%, 5%, 10% level with false discovery rate correction for multiple 
(four) comparisons ( Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995 ); MP (MS) stands for Market-Partners (Market- 
Strangers); in OSDG-MP-RE ‘low-low’ (‘high-high’) [‘high-low’] corresponds to matchings with low 
(high) [mixed] exchange rates in the real effort task preceding the SDG. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is consistent with the correlational evidence reported in Henrich et al. (2001) and suggests that there exists a ‘cooperation
rent’ for traders who are successful in markets, but only when the market interaction is with ‘strangers’. 
Our study can be of general interest for economists. The results show that competitive market experience can have
significant and substantial spillover effects and impose economic costs (or, in some cases, benefits) in spheres of social
interaction outside of the market. It is, of course, possible that the observed spillover effects would be smaller or even
disappear in a market setting less extreme that the one we studied. Nevertheless, one can argue that market conditions
like the ones in our experiment are representative for some ‘naturally’ occurring markets, as for instance, labor markets
with high job insecurity. A more specific conclusion from our results could be drawn for the voluntary provision of (local)
public goods. Namely, that people who are competing on a market with each other will be less likely to contribute to
the local public good efficiently. Speculatively, this may provide an argument in favor of so-called ‘social mixing’ in urban
planning ( Uitermark, 2003; Lees, 2008 ): social mixing could increase local social capital because it decreases the likelihood
that people who have to compete on the same side of the same market live in the same neighborhood. 
We motivated our research questions using the framework of Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) , who argue that pref-
erences are state-dependent in the sense that “...actions are motivated by a repertoire of heterogeneous preferences the
salience of which depends on the nature of the decision situation.” (p. 372) The nature of the decision situation can also
be affected by social experiences and different experiences can trigger different states. Our results may thus be understood
in terms of state-dependent preferences. They are consistent with the notion that competitive market experience triggers a
less cooperative preference state towards those one has directly competed with. This occurs regardless of whether one has
competed with each other on the short or the long side of the market. The fact that this effect is also present for traders on
the short side (market-winners) is quite remarkable. It highlights that the issue is not whether people have had competitive
experience per se or have been successful in terms of income, but whether one has been in competition with each other or
not. 
Our observations call for a refinement of the concept of state-dependence. The question is why exactly certain types of
market experience lead to less cooperation. One possible explanation is that direct competition per se damages affective
social ties or may even lead to negative ties, while successful trades per se have a counterbalancing effect and may create or
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strengthen ties (for evidence on and the effects of social ties in the lab and the field, see, e.g., van Dijk and vanWinden, 1997;
van Winden, 2012; Bault et al., 2015 ). This may explain why competition on the same market appears to be harmful for
cooperation while this is not the case when this competitive experience was with somebody else. It is also consistent with
the idea that a competitive seller–buyer relation even when it is asymmetric does not damage or even enhance affective
ties between the traders (cf. the doux commerce idea of Montesquieu, 1748 ). 
Another potentially important channel could work through how people’s beliefs about others’ cooperation are affected by
market experience of different kinds. The result that cooperation rates of buyers and sellers in mixed pairs do not differ in
the first period of the SDG suggests that differences in beliefs are not a main driving force of cooperation behavior. However,
this evidence is only indirect and certainly not conclusive. The investigation of the precise role of beliefs and possible other
mechanisms behind our behavioral results could be an exciting future research avenue. 
Lastly we note that our results do not imply that competition other than competitive market interaction would not
affect subsequent behavior. In fact, some of the studies cited in the literature section show that non-market competition
can affect cooperation. In this paper we studied a kind of market competition that is of special interest given the societal
relevance of such markets. Nevertheless, future research could address the question if an environment where participants
compete against each other in a non-market environment (probably with non-monetary rewards) would affect subsequent
cooperation in a social dilemma similarly to what we find in our market environments. 
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